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I Introduction 
“International law generally rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests 
are at stake.” 1 
There had been a fierce debate when Hassan Ahmed Shaqlane, a Somalian refugee who was 
sentenced to an 8-year prison term for rape and kidnapping, won his appeal against deportation, 
upheld by the Deportation Review Tribunal.2 Controversy arose again when Al Baiiaty, an Iraqi 
resettlement refugee was convicted of sexual violation by rape for the fourth time. With the 
Court of Appeal’s noting that Mr Al Baiiaty poses a serious risk to the community3, the then 
Minister of Immigration called for a report on the deportation issues raised by the case.4  
Deportation to torture may deprive a refugee of the right to liberty, security and perhaps life5, 
which is against many states’ domestic laws and international instruments such as the 
International Conant on Civil and Political Rights6 and the Convention against Torture7. It has 
been said that even if Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not 
categorically reject deportation to torture on its face, it should not be used to deny rights that 
other legal interments make available to everyone.8 It is highly questionable, however, under this 
broad obligation, if a refugee poses a significant threat to the protecting country’s national 
security, what action can a state take to protect its own national security and its own people. Are 
provision in the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT absolute, binding and non 
derogable? If so, can a state derogate from its international obligation to refoule a refugee to 
potential torture to protect its national security? On what grounds then, can a state derogate from 
it?  
This paper will consider these questions. By doing so, this paper will first outline the 
international obligations, provided by the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT, what is 
an international norm and states’ derogation rights in these provisions. The paper then looks at 
the courts in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s approach in Suresh, EN9 and 
                                                 
1 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 SCC 1 at [75]. 
2 (10 September 2003) 611 NZPD 8523. 
3 R v Al Baiiaty [2005] NZCA 120/05. See New Zealand Press Association “Iraqi Refugee Loses Rape Appeal” The 
New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 18 October 2005). See also Rodger Haines ”National Security and Non-
refoulement in New Zealand: Commentary on Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2)” in Jane McAdam (ed) Forced 
Migration, Human Rights and Security, Studies in International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 133 at 134.  
4 Angela Gregory “Rapist Faces Expulsion from NZ” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 19 November 
2004).   
5 Ibid n 1 at [5].  
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature December 16 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976).  
7 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 
(opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987).  
8 Above n1 at [70]. 
9 EN (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2009] EWCA Civ 630. 
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Zaoui10 when deporting a person who poses threat to national security can lead to torture and 
arbitrarily deprivation of life and the deportation potentially violates an international obligation 
or a state’s constitution. The paper will explain their approaches in relation to the different 
positions of their international obligations. The paper submits its concerns for some specific 
provisions in the Refugee Convention and the issues in exercising the absolute rights provided by 
the ICCPR and the CAT, as well as the ECHR. The paper finally submits its preferable approach 
after observing states’ practice and comparative study of the three approaches.   
II Provisions, International Norm and Derogation  
This paper will first examine the relevant provisions in the CAT, the ICCPR and the Refugee 
Convention. 
Article 3 of the CAT prohibits signatories from returning a person to another state where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.  
Article 7 of the ICCPR reads “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment…” 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits contracting states from returning a refugee to 
where his life or freedom could be threatened, with exception that this provision excludes a 
person that is subjected to a danger to the security of the country and constituting a danger to the 
community of that country, where he is or has been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime.  
In addition to Article 33, Article 1 (F) of the Refugee Convention has even excluded unworthy 
persons from protection of the convention, 
 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom 
there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as 
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of 
such crimes; 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to 
his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
 
                                                 
10 Zaoui v Attorney-General (No.2) [2006] NZLR 289. 
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None of the provisions above is subject to reservations. It is apparent that the Refugee 
Convention has left the door open for states expelling refugees to torture, provided the exception 
is satisfied. By contrast, provisions provided by Article 3 of the CAT and Article 7 of the ICCPR 
are final, with no exception at all and they are not subject to derogation of contracting states. 
While the Refugee Convention excludes persons who have committed serious crimes from its 
protections, the ICCPR and the CAT protect everyone’s rights. Therefore, there are definitely 
contradictions of protection in the Refugee Convention comparing to the ICCPR and the CAT. 
Protections in the Refugee Convention are definitely narrower.  
Since most of the signatories of the CAT and the ICCPR have ratified the Refugee Convention, it 
is interesting to see what each signatory of all these three conventions would do when such 
contradictions occur. Especially when a person poses substantial threat to a state, and that state is 
a signatory of the ICCPR and the CAT, how will the state approach an issue where derogation is 
prohibited?  
Not only derogation is prohibited when a specific provision states so, no derogation is permitted 
under a peremptory norm, which was defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties11,  
A Norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.  
 
Provisions that are incorporated into domestic law, too, are binding for state parties. Bearing 
these provisions in mind, this paper will now turn to the practice of the courts, to analyse each of 
their approaches.   
III Canada 
A Suresh 
 
The Court in Suresh has examined conditions for deportation in the Immigration Act12 whether or 
not constitutional.  In doing so, the Court looked at the Charter13, the Immigration Act and the 
international norms.  
                                                 
11 Vienna Convention on Law and Treaties (opened for signature on 23 May 1969, came into force  27 January 
1980). 
12 Immigration Act 1995. 
13 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom 1982. 
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Section 53 of the Immigration Act does not prohibit deporting a person to a country where the 
person’s life or freedom would be threatened. Section 7 of the Charter, however, guarantees 
everyone’s right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Therefore, the only question is 
whether the deportation to torture is in compliance with the principles of fundamental justice. If 
so, Section 53 of the Immigration Act is unconstitutional, ie deportation to torture is 
unconstitutional.  
The Court stated that the relevant principles of fundamental justice are determined by a 
contextual approach that ‘take[s] into account the nature of the decision to be made”14. “The 
approach is essentially one of balancing…balancing process that the outcome may well vary 
from case to case depending on the mix of contextual factors put into the balance15”. In this case, 
to carry a balancing test on deportation to torture, a variety of factors including the circumstances 
or conditions of the potential deportee, the danger that the deportee presents to Canadians or the 
country’s security, and the threat of terrorism to Canada should be considered.16 The Court 
decided that the government must be queried whether the response of the government is 
reasonable, and proportionate to its interests in relation to the threat.17  
As for determining whether or not deportation to torture in general violates the fundamental 
justice, the Court looked in the Canadian perspective and international norm perspective.  
The Court first concluded that torture in Canada is unjust18. While in Canadian jurisprudence, 
extraditing a person to face torture would be inconsistent with fundamental justice, as Section 7 
is concerned not only with the act of extraditing, but also the potential outcome of extradition, 
refouling a person should be applied with the same principle, the guarantee of fundamental 
justice applies even to deprivation of life, liberty or security.19 
 
Where Canada’s participation is a necessary precondition for the deprivation and where 
the deprivation is an entirely foreseeable consequence of Canada’s participation, the 
government does not avoid the guarantee of fundamental justice merely because the 
deprivation in question would be affected by someone else’ hand.20  
 
                                                 
14 Above n1 at [45]. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid at [47]. 
18 Ibid at [49]-[52]. 
19 Ibid at [53]-[55]. 
20 Ibid at [54]. 
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Therefore, deporting a person to torture violates fundamental justice from Canadian 
perspective.21 However, Canadian jurisprudence does not suggest that Canada may never deport 
a person to face treatment elsewhere that would be unconstitutional if imposed in Canada.22 The 
appropriate approach for deciding a specific case is balancing test.23  
When examining fundamental justice within the international law perspective, the Court noted 
that Canada’s compliance with international obligations is not binding unless they have been 
incorporated into Canadian law by enactment.24 The Court recognised prohibition on torture is an 
international norm as first, it is prohibited in a great number of multilateral instruments25; second, 
states’ practice has never legalised torture or recognised torture in their involvement26; third, it 
has been reached to a consensus by a number of international authorities that prohibition on 
torture is an established jus cogens27. Therefore, it cannot be easily derogated.  
The Court has noticed the clear contradiction from the ICCPR, the CAT and the Refugee 
Convention. The Court has also stated that the contradiction should not to be read to be 
weakened, rather the provisions in the CAT, without an explicit provision against derogation 
together with the “without prejudice” wording, do not suggest the CAT is subjected to be 
derogated.28 Moreover, with the advice sent from the Committee against Torture and the relevant 
case law, the better view concluded by the Court is that international norm prohibits deportation 
to torture, even where national security interests are at stake.29  
Therefore, the Court concluded at this point that both domestic and international jurisprudence 
suggest that torture is so abhorrent that it will almost always be disproportionate to interests on 
the other side of the balance, even security interests.30 Fundamental justice in Section 7 of the 
Charter will be violated in both Canadian and international perspective if deporting a person to 
torture.31  For determining each individual case, the Minister of Immigration is obliged to carry a 
balancing test in accordance with the constitution.32 The Court referred to Lord Hoffmann in 
Rehman and Lord Slynn of Hadley to reinstate the importance of weighing the importance of 
national security and the serious outcome of deportation for the deportee.33 The Court further 
concluded that the Immigration Act leaves open the possibility of deportation to torture; the 
                                                 
21 Ibid at [56]-[57]. 
22 Ibid at [58]. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid at [60]-[61]. 
25 Ibid at [62]. 
26 Ibid at [63]. 
27 Ibid at [64]. 
28 Ibid at [71]-[72].  
29 Ibid at [73]- [75].  
30 Ibid at [76]. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at [77]. 
33 Ibid. 
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Minister should generally decline to deport a refugee if there is a substantial risk of torture.34 The 
Court clarified further that this finding, however, does not exclude the possibility to deport a 
person to torture in exceptional circumstances as an outcome of balancing test or as under 
provisions in Section 1 of the Charter where exceptional conditions justify violation of 
fundamental justice stated in Section 7 of the Charter.35  
 
Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person where there are substantial grounds to 
believe he or she would be tortured on return, this is not because Article 3 of the CAT 
directly constrains the actions of the Canadian government, but because the fundamental 
justice balance under S[ection] 7 of the Charter generally precludes deportation to torture 
when applied on a case by case basis. We may predict that it will rarely be stuck in 
favour of expulsion where there is a serious risk of torture. However, as the matter is one 
of balance, precise prediction is elusive. The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport 
to torture, if any, must await future cases.36  
 
That said, deporting a person to torture as a consequence of balancing test or under exceptional 
circumstances in Section 1 of the Charter, Section 53 of the Immigration act is constitutional. 
The issue in this case is not the legislation, but the Minister’s obligation to exercise the discretion 
in Section 53 according to the constitution. It is the Minister’s obligation to weight relevant 
factors in compliance with the constitution, to decide whether or not a person should be refouled.  
B Conclusion 
 
Canada’s approach in refoulement, as indicated in Suresh, is an examination on its domestic law 
in compliance with its constitution, specifically the fundamental justice. The Court in Suresh has 
examined fundamental justice in both domestic law and international law, with recognition that 
prohibition on torture is jus cogens. The Court has noted that Canada is not bound by the 
provisions stated in the CAT, where lies the most stringent rules on non refoulement. However, 
fundamental justice, as valued by its constitution must be complied. In deciding whether or not 
fundamental justice will be violated in deporting a person to torture, the Court has concluded that 
both Canadian law and international norm prohibits deportation to torture. However, in deciding 
a specific case, a balancing test must be carried by the Minister, with the constitution in mind. 
Generally when balancing Canada’s interest and the consequence of deporting a person to torture, 
it will be disproportionate for the Minister to confirm a deportation order. However, in 
circumstances where balancing test is carried and the risk the person in question imposes to 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid at [78]. 
36 Ibid. 
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Canada weighs more than the consequence of deporting the person, or the exceptional 
circumstances in Section 1 of the Charter is met, Canada can deport a person even if there are 
substantial grounds to believe the person might be subject to torture on return.  
After Suresh, similar issue raises in Ahani37, the Court in Ahani applied the analytical framework 
set out in Suresh and concluded that in the case of Ahani,  where the proper principles and 
relevant factors were taken into account by the Minister, the decision of deporting Ahani should 
not be found unreasonable.38 Moreover, a reviewing court should not reweigh the factors or 
interfere merely because it would have come to a different conclusion.39 The Court found the 
Parliament intended to grant the Minister a broad discretion in issuing a deportation order; it 
should only be reviewable where the Minister makes a patently unreasonable decision.40 That is 
to say, in Canada, a court should not intervene with the Minister’s decision, if it was not made 
arbitrarily or in bad faith, cannot be supported on the evidence, or did not take into account the 
appropriate factors. The Minister has broad discretion carrying balancing test and issuing 
deportation order based on the outcome.  
 
IV The United Kingdom  
 
A EN 
 
The Court of Appeal of the United Kingdom has made some interesting findings in EN, when 
considering the reasonableness and lawfulness of Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 (Specification of Particularly Serious Crimes) Order 200441. 
Under Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, persons who are 
convicted of offences and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 2 years should be 
presumed to have been convicted by a particular serious crime and to constitute a danger to the 
community for the purposes of Article 32(2) of the Refugee Convention. In addition, the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002(Specification of Particularly Serious Crimes) 
Order 2004, made under Section 72(4)(a)-a person is convicted of an offence specified by order 
of the Secretary of State, specifies a large number of criminal offences that should be presumed 
                                                 
37 Ahani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 72. 
38 Ibid at [22]. 
39 Ibid at [16]. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Specification of Particularly Serious Crimes) Order 2004 (UK). 
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as particular serious crime for the purpose of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, 
irrespective of the sentence imposed by the court. 
In EN, appeals by EN and KC were heard together. EN was convicted and sentenced to12 
months’ detention in a young offender’s institution for burglary and 2 months for the offence of 
possessing an offensive weapon. The Secretary of State sought his deportation, as his criminal 
conviction would be conductive to public good under the Immigration Act 1971.42 
KC was a mandate refugee and was convicted of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm and sentenced to community punishment and rehabilitation order.43 His breaking the terms 
of his community rehabilitation order resulted in him receiving a three year prison sentence. In 
addition to that, KC was also convicted of possession of a bladed article and sentenced for two 
months imprisonment.44 His further application for asylum was refused and he was served with a 
deportation order.45 
Both parties challenged the deportation order and the term of “particular serious crime”. 
The Court examined whether the Refugee Convention has been incorporated into English law. 
Citing the decision in R v Asfaw46, where it referred to decision in R v Immigration Officer at 
Prague Airport47,  
 
It is plain from these authorities that the British regime for handling applications for 
asylum has been closely assimilated to the Convention model. But it is also plain that the 
Convention as a whole has never been formally incorporated or given effect in domestic 
law… The giving effect in domestic law to international obligation is primarily a matter 
for the legislature. It is for Parliament to determine the extent to which those obligations 
ate to be incorporated domestically. That determination having been made, it is the duty 
of the courts to give effect to it.  
 
The Court found the Refugee Convention does not have the force of statute under domestic law.48 
The Court then looked at the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Specification of 
Particularity Serious Crime) Order 2004. The Court noted that the 2004 Order listed a large 
number of offences as offences to which Section 72(4)(2) applies, irrespective of the sentence 
                                                 
42 Above n9 at [10]- [12].  
43 Ibid at [24]. 
44 Ibid at [25] 
45 Ibid at [26]. 
46 R v Asfaw[2008] 1 AC 1061 at [29]. 
47 R (European Roman Rights Centre & Ors) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport & Anor [2005] 2 AC 1. 
48 Above n9 at [59]. 
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imposed.49 To the Court, the list does not only list offences that can be reasonably regarded as 
particularly serious crimes, for example, offences unlawfully and maliciously doing an act, 
intending or conspiring to cause an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to 
property, but also many offences that cannot be regarded as particularly serious crimes 
sensibly.50 The Court has specified few offences as examples: theft, with no qualification as to 
the nature or value of the item or items stolen; entering a building as a trespasser, intending to 
steal, inflict or attempt to inflict grievous bodily harm or rape, which can include someone 
entering a building without permission intending to steal a milk bottle; an offence of destroying 
or damaging, without lawful excuse, another’s property intending to destroy or damage or being 
reckless as to that, which can include someone scratching the paintwork of another person’s 
car.51  
The Court has noted, however, the power given by Section 72(4)(a) is restricted to offences that 
the Secretary of State could sensibly consider its seriousness in its statutory presumptions.52 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Secretary of State misunderstood the extent and purpose 
of the statutory power when formulating the list of offences to the Order, and she exceeded the 
statutory in doing so. Therefore, the 2004 Order is unlawful.53   
The Court found a tribunal cannot quash delegated legislation.54 Further, the Court pointed out 
that Article 33 allows a state to refoule a refugee if its requirements are met.55 It is the European 
Convention on Human Rights56 that precludes refoulement if there is a risk of torture on return.57  
Historically, European Court of Human Right has upheld Chahal’ complaint in Chahal v The 
United Kingdom58 in 1996, before the United Kingdom incorporated European Convention on 
Human Rights into its Human Rights Act 199859, which came into effect in 2000. In Chahal v the 
United Kingdom, the complainant claimed that his deportation to his home country would result 
in a substantial risk of torture, which would make his deportation a violation of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human rights, where torture is prohibited.  
The ECtHR noted that the deportation order against the complainant was made on the ground 
that he imposed risk to national security. In the submission of the United Kingdom, the 
                                                 
49 Ibid at [81]. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid at [82]. 
53 Ibid at [83]. 
54 Ibid at [87]. 
55 Ibid at [98]. 
56 European Convention on Human Rights 213 UNTS 221(opened for signature 04 November 1950, entered into 
force 03 September 1953). 
57 Above n9 at [98]. 
58 Chahal v The United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 (ECHR). 
59 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
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provisions in Article 3 are not absolute in cases of refoulement. The Government based this 
submission on the possibility of implied limitations as recognised in Soering,60 
 
Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation… The question remains 
whether the extradition of a fugitive to another State where he could be subjected or be 
likely to be subjected to torture…What amounts to ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ depends on all the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, inherent in the 
whole of the convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights…Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not 
only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to 
undermine the foundations of extradition. These considerations must also be included 
among the factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the 
notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition cases.  
 
The Court noted that the danger a person posed to national security of the contracting state was a 
factor to be weighted in the balance when considering the issues under Article 3.61 The Court 
stated that when there existed a substantial risk of deportation to torture, which was the case of 
Chahal, the danger to national security could weigh heavily in the balance to be struck between 
protecting the interest of the individual and the whole community.62 The Court agreed with the 
Complainant’s argument that in any case, considerations on national security could not justify 
deporting a person to torture.63 The prohibition of torture provided by Article 3 is equally 
absolute in refoulement cases.64 Therefore, deportation to torture is a violation of Article 3 of the 
ECHR, even when national security is concerned. Prohibition on torture provided in Article 3 of 
the ECHR is absolute and non derogable.  
The decision in Chahal has a long lasting effect on the use of deportation in the UK. However, 
since the 7/7 bombings, the UK’s government has announced a renewed determination to use 
deportation as a counter-terrorism measure.65 In the Observation in Ramzy v the Netherlands66, 
the governments. including the UK government, has asked the Court in Ramzy to consider that67, 
 
                                                 
60 Soering v the United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 (ECHR) at [88]. 
61 Ibid at [76]. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at [77]. 
64 Ibid at [80]. 
65 Deportation on Grounds of National Security (2007) Justice <www.justice.org.uk>. 
66 Ramzy v the Netherlands (2005) (Application No 25424/05) (ECHR). 
67 Observation of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Solvakia and the United Kingdom Intervening in 
Application No 25424/05 Ramzy v the Netherlands. (2005). 
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whether recognising the increased and major threat posed by international terrorism, it is 
appropriate or justified to maintain the principle that in the situation outlined above there 
is only a single relevant issue, namely whether or not substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned would face a real risk of being subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving state. On that basis, it can never be 
appropriate even to take into account as relevant the fact, nature or degree of the national 
security threat posed by an individual… The particular difficulty encountered by 
contracting states is caused both by the absolute nature of the prohibition against removal 
and by the relatively low threshold of risk that needs to be demonstrated before it arises. 
 
The governments suggest that no challenge is to be made to the absolute nature of Article 3.68 
However, the context of removal involves assessment of risk of torture, and needs to afford 
proper weight to the fundamental rights of the citizens of contracting states who are threatened 
by terrorism.69 National security considerations should not simply be dismissed as irrelevant in 
this context, whether or not a removal of a person is a violation of Article 3.70 The governments 
concluded by suggesting the ECtHR reconsider and change the approach and principles set out in 
Chahal, that prohibition on torture is absolute even when a person poses a threat to national 
security.71  
Despite the UK’s intervention in Ramzy, Article 3 is still not subjected to derogation to date. The 
UK government has signed Memorandum of Understanding with Jordan and Libya, under which 
the government seeks to deport persons in questions to these countries with guaranteeing them 
diplomatic assurances. It is highly questionable, though, whether diplomatic assurances are 
effective in minimising the risk of torture and whether or not this Memorandum of 
Understanding is a violation of human rights protected by many international instruments and 
ECHR. 
It is certain, however, refouling a refugee to torture is a violation of ECHR. 
B Conclusion 
 
The UK’s approach in refoulement is based on its domestic law. The Secretary of State needs to 
consider the seriousness of each case sensibly given its statutory presumption is ultra vires. The 
Secretary of State needs to understand its power and the extent of the statutory when making a 
decision of issuing a deportation order.  
                                                 
68 Ibid at [3]. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid at [37]. 
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If deporting a person when the requirements in Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention are met, 
it will still be a violation of Article 3 of ECHR if there is a substantial ground for believing there 
will be torture on return. Unlike Canada, the UK is bound by the absolute provisions of ECHR. 
The United Kingdom cannot deport a person to torture when a serious risk of torture is 
established.  
V New Zealand 
A Zaoui  
In Immigration Act 198772, based on part of which Zaoui was considered, Section 72 gives 
provisions on procedure of deporting a person threatening national security, 
 
Where the Minister certifies that the continued presence in New Zealand of any person 
names in the certificate constitutes a threat to national security, the Governor-General 
may, by Order in Council, order the deportation from New Zealand of that person.  
 
Issues raised in Zaoui have similarities with Suresh, yet the approach taken by the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand is much different.  
The Court first examined the balancing test from the meaning of Article 33(2) of the Refugee 
Convention. Noting that New Zealand directly incorporated the Refugee Convention in the then 
Section 114C(6)(a)- “that there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to 
the security of New Zealand, in terms of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention”, the Court 
first considered the question whether the exception stated in Article 33(2) set a bar to permit 
states deporting refugees on itself, or it incorporates balancing test.73 In doing so, the Court 
considered the wordings of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, other provisions of the 
Refugee Convention, international law, other states’ practice and the drafting history. 
The Court stated that reading from the ordinary meaning of Article 33(1) and Article 33(2), the 
two provisions are not related in any proportionate or balancing way.74 If Article 33(2) is satisfied, 
the prohibition of non refoulement in Article 33(1) is defeated. The Court noted that “while the 
law sometimes appear to require such weighing, such an interpretation is to be avoided unless is 
it plainly called for.75” 
                                                 
72 Immigration Act 1987. 
73 Above n10 at [22]. 
74 Ibid at [25]-[27]. 
75 Ibid at [27]. 
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The Court then looked at the context of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. The Court took 
Article 1F as an example to state that the context of the Refugee Convention supports that no 
balancing test is required.76 The Court referred to the judgment in S v Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority77 for support that Article 1F is clear and unambiguous78, 
 
It directs attention to the commission of a serious crime, nothing more, nothing less. The 
seriousness of a crime bears no relationship to and is not governed by matters extraneous 
to the offending. There is nothing in art 1F to justify reading into its provisions restrictive 
or qualifying words such as those which would be necessary to require a balancing 
exercise of the kind suggested. 
 
The Court then turned to examine state practice and noted that the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Australia all rejected balancing test as an element of Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention.79 The Court examined the drafting history of the Refugee Convention and found no 
element of balance was suggested.80  The Court then listed authorities that either rejected or made 
no reference to proportionality test. 81  The Court mentioned the use of balancing test in Suresh, 
noting it has been criticised “since it contemplates derogations from absolute protection under 
international law”.82 On this point, the Court concluded that balancing test should be rejected.  
The Court decided to adopt the test stated in Suresh that to comply with Article 33(2), the person 
in question must be believed on reasonable grounds to pose a serious threat to the security of 
New Zealand; the threat must be based on objectively reasonable grounds and the threat must be 
substantial.83  
The Court then analysed Article 33(2) with provisions in Article 3 of the CAT and Article 6 and 
Article 7 of the ICCPR. The Court decided that the Refugee Convention has not been amended 
by the ICCPR or the CAT.84 While the prohibition on torture has been overwhelmingly supported 
as jus cogens, there is no support for the prohibition on refoulement to torture to be recognised as 
jus cogens.85   Therefore, the Court stated Article 33(2) must be considered in its own terms.  
                                                 
76 Ibid at [28]-[30]. 
77 S v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [1998] 2 NZLR 291. 
78 Ibid at [8].  
79 Above n10 at [31]-[32]. 
80 Ibid at [36]-[38]. 
81 Ibid at [39]-[41]. 
82 Ibid at [40]. 
83 Ibid at [45]. 
84 Ibid at [47]-[50] 
85 Ibid at [51]. 
16 
 
The Court noted, even if the provisions in Article 8 and Article 9 of the Bill of Rights have not 
addresses the issues on non reoulement directly, they have long been understood as applying to 
New Zealand if it is going to deport a person to torture.86  
Article 8 of the Bill of Rights states “no one shall be deprived of life except on such grounds as 
are established by law and are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. 
Article 9 protects the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment, “everyone has the 
right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, degrading, or disproportionately server treatment or 
punishment. 
Under Article 6 of the Bill of Rights, “wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is 
consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be 
preferred to any other meaning”, the Court decided that Section 72 shall be given a meaning 
consistent with the rights and freedom contained in the Bill of Rights, which includes the right 
not to be arbitrarily deprived of life and not to be subjected to torture, also the meaning should be 
in accordance with international law, both customary and treaty-based.87 Since the Bill of Rights 
is an Act to affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the ICCPR, and Section 8 and Section 9 of the 
Bill of Rights closely tracks the Article 3 of the CAT, the interpretation and the practise of 
Section 72 of the then Immigration Act should be consistent with the ICCPR and the CAT as 
well.88   
Since the provisions in Article 8 and Article 9 of the Bill of Rights and the relevant provisions in 
the ICCPR and the CAT prohibit subjecting a person to torture, the Court concluded, based on its 
findings that deportation should be carried with prohibition on torture89,  
 
The Minister, in deciding whether to certify under Section 72 of the Immigration Act 
1987 that the continued presence of a person constitutes  threat to national security…in 
deciding whether to advise the Governor-General to order deportation under Section 72, 
are not to so decide or advise if they are satisfied that there are substantial grounds for 
believing that, as a result of the deportation, the person would be in danger of being 
arbitrarily deprived of life or of being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.  
 
                                                 
86 Ibid at [79]. 
87 Ibid at [90]. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid at [93]. 
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B Conclusion  
The New Zealand Court rejected practicing balancing test, with reasons that proportionality test 
was not called by the Refugee Convention, and it was rejected by many authorities. The Court 
further denied that non refoulement is jus congens as it was not supported overwhelming as the 
principle of prohibition on torture. The Court decided to interpret Article 33(2) of the Refugee 
Convention on its own terms. Moreover, since Article 6 of the Bill of Rights requires if a 
meaning can be given to an enactment and that meaning is consistent the rights and freedoms 
provisions contained in the Bill of Rights, then that meaning should be given in preference. The 
Court therefore stated that Section 72, provisions on deportation should be interpreted and 
practiced in consistency with the prohibition on arbitrarily deprivation of life and torture 
provided by the Bill of Rights. Moreover, since the Bill of Rights is to affirm New Zealand’s 
commitment to the ICCPR, and that Section 8 and Section 9 of the Bill of Rights are in track 
with Article 3 of the CAT, Section 72 should be interpreted and practiced in accordance with the 
ICCPR and the CAT as well. 
The Court noted that the obligations for state parties not to subject a person to torture are 
absolute. The Court noted that New Zealand has incorporated the Article 33(2) of the Refugee 
Convention to its then Immigration Act. However, the Court did not specify the connections 
between the ICCRP and the CAT with New Zealand. This paper proposes that either the 
affirmation for the ICCPR by the Bill of Rights or the similar provisions on the prohibition on 
torture is sufficient enough to interpret that New Zealand has officially incorporated these two 
international instruments by enactment. Therefore, it is questionable, whether or not the ICCPR 
and the CAT is binding to the New Zealand courts.  Clearly in Zaoui, the Court bound itself to 
these obligations to affirm New Zealand’s commitment to international obligations. 
As for balancing test, to cite Lord Bingham in Brown v Stott90 on the limits to implying 
obligations into a human rights treaty such as the ECHR91, 
 
In interpreting the Convention, as any other treaty, it is generally to be assumed that the 
parties have included the terms which they wished to include and on which they were 
able to agree, omitting other terms which they did not wish to include or on which they 
were not able to agree. Thus particular regard must be had and reliance placed on the 
express terms of the Convention, which define the rights and freedoms which the 
contracting parties have undertaken to secure. This does not mean that nothing can be 
implied into the Convention.  
  
Similarly, as House of Lords observed in Adan v Home Secretary92, 
                                                 
90 Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681. 
91 Ibid at 703. 
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Inevitably, the final text will have been the product of a long period of negotiation and 
compromise…It follows that one is more likely to arrive at the true construction of [the 
Refugee Convention] by seeking a meaning which makes sense in the light of the 
Convention as a whole, and the purposes which the framers of the Convention were 
seeking to achieve, rather than by concerning exclusively on the language. A broad 
approach is what is needed rather than a narrow linguistic approach. 
 
Surely the Refugee Convention, on its plain terms, does not require balancing test. This does not 
mean, though, balancing test is not applicable when interpreting the Refugee Convention.  The 
UNHCR Handbook suggested93,  
 
If a person has well-founded fear of very server persecutions, eg, persecutions 
endangering his life or freedom, a crime must be very grave in order to exclude him. If 
the persecution is less serious, it will be necessary to have regard to the nature of the 
crime or crimes presumed to have been committed in order to establish whether the 
appellant is not in reality a fugitive from justice or whether his criminal character does 
not outweigh his character as a bona fids refugee. 
 
We should bear in mind, though, in UNHCR’s position, Article 1(f) and Article 33(2) are for 
state parties’ interests in barring fugitives. This paper will turn to discuss this later.  
Many countries do not agree with the UNHCR’s balancing approach mainly on the grounds that 
public interest should not be the ground to justify a potential serious crime during balancing test. 
“The claimant to whom the exclusion clause applies is ex hypothesi in danger of persecution; the 
crime which he has committed to by definition “serious”…It is not the public interest that this 
country should become a safe haven for mass bombers.94” 
The Court in Zaoui, clearly, rejected balancing test not on this ground.  It then becomes 
problematic, this paper suggests, when the Court adopted the test in Suresh judging qualification 
for Article 33(2) on the ground that the person in question must be believed on reasonable 
grounds to pose a serious threat to the security of New Zealand; the threat must be based on 
objectively reasonable grounds the threat must be substantial.  
                                                                                                                                                             
92 Adan v Home Secretary [1999] 1 AC 293, 305[1998] at [54]. 
93 ENHCR’s Handbook on   Procedure and Criteria for Determing Refugee Status. Available at <www.hrea.org>. at 
[156]. 
94 Gil v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 1 FC 508, 534-35.  
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This paper submits, without balancing test, it is not easy to decide the seriousness of the threat, 
when the threat is out of the scope from what is described and implied by Article 1(F) of the 
Refugee Convention. It is more problematic, when the Court chose to bind itself by the 
international obligations on prohibition on torture, provided by the ICCPR and the CAT, then the 
relevant provisions in the Refugee Convention becomes either useless or unnecessarily widen. 
Because if a court decides to practice provisions stated in the ICCPR and the CAT, even if a 
person who is deemed as unworthy of being protected as a refugee under Article 1(F) of the 
Refugee Convention or a person who is deemed as applicable for states to refoule as he poses 
danger to a state’s national security, the person will not be either striped of refugee status or 
refused of protection. In this case, the Refugee Convention’s effect on a state party becomes 
powerless. The relevant provisions will become unwillingly widen by a state party’s practice as 
well. Provided the Court in Zaoui found that the Refugee Convention has not been amended by 
the ICCPR and the CAT, its practice in dealing with contradiction of international obligations 
seems inconsistent with its findings.  
More importantly, as the Court noted, Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention has been 
incorporated into the then Immigration Act, the Court’s finding violated its own domestic law, in 
some sense, by finding the obligations in the ICCPR and the CAT absolute. The Court has also 
introduced the absolute non refoulement obligation in Zaoui, which is potentially problematic for 
future case practice.  
VI Conclusion 
It is clear on examining practices by the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand on 
deporting a refugee back to potential torture, the international obligation on prohibition on 
torture is absolute. Each state’s approach is different so are their obligations.   
The United Kingdom as a member state of the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR, the CAT and 
more importantly, the ECHR, has to bind the prohibition on torture rule as it has incorporated the 
ECHR into its domestic law. No derogation is allowed in Article 3 of the ECHR and no 
reservation is allowed. Therefore, the United Kingdom cannot refoule a person back to his home 
country if there is a risk that person facing torture or arbitrarily deprivation of life in return. 
Canada, as a member state of the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAR, decided to 
derogate from the absolute prohibition on torture provided by the ICCPR and the CAT, with the 
Court in Suresh’s finding that international obligations are not binding unless Canada has 
incorporated it into its legislation. Returning a person to torture is lawful as long as it is in 
accordance with the constitution, notwithstanding a breach or a potential breach of the ICCPR 
and the CAT.  
New Zealand, as a member state of the three conventions above as well as Canada, decided not 
to practice its then domestic law which has incorporated the Refugee Convention, but to practice 
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its absolute obligation provided in the ICCPR and the CAT, which mirrors the Bill of Rights, 
where the rights and freedoms contained in it are not absolute but may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.  
That said, derogation is not permitted in jus cogens. However, in this paper’s observation, a state 
can be able to derogate from a jus cogens if the jus cogens is not enacted by its legislation.  
The paper now will turn to discuss the issues in the provisions of the Refugee Convention and 
the absolute obligation provided by the ICCPR, the CAT and similarly the UCHR.  
This paper has addressed that Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention is to bar the entry of 
refugee status, as persons who have committed particular serious crimes that the Refugee 
Convention refuses to protect. That said, the crimes against humanity now includes a large 
numbers of crimes95, but the listed crimes are only crimes against humanity if “committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, which knowledge 
of the attack96”, defined to mean “a course of conduct involving the multiple commissions of 
acts …against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organisational 
policy to commit such attack97”. In which case, Article 1(F) bars fairly small amount of 
dangerous fugitives.  
The problem is, the ICCPR and the CAT, as well as the ECHR protects everyone, even if a 
person committed a crime against humanity he still shall be protected from torture and arbitrarily 
deprivation of life. This paper is not suggesting that persons who are serious criminals should not 
be protected from torture or arbitrarily deprivation of life, rather this paper submits that persons 
from the protecting states’ rights should be considered as well. The governments including the 
United Kingdom have submitted in their observations in Ramzy, that it is important in 
considering the rights of the citizens of the contracting state to have regard to the nature of the 
threat currently posed by terrorism.98 It suggested that it needs to be clearly recognised that rights 
provided by the ECHR represent a significant extension of the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention.99 Moreover, the governments stated the difficulties created by the judgment in 
Chahal100, 
 
The majority’s judgment in Chahal creates real difficulties for contracting states in the 
context of protecting their citizens effectively against the threat of terrorism…If that 
                                                 
95 International Criminal Court <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. See James James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey “Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder” 
258 (2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal at 265-266.  
98 Above n 87 at [7].  
99 Ibid at [9]. 
100 Ibid at [11]. 
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judgment is accepted as currently understood, in a case in which substantial grounds are 
shown for believing that there is a real risk of ill-treatment in a receiving state, it is not 
possible to remove a person believed to threaten the contracting state and its citizens 
through terrorism…  
 
The Governments then submitted that in the context of deporting a person who poses a national 
security risk, the threat posed by the person whose removal is being considered can and should 
be a relevant factor to be weighed against the possibility and nature of torture and arbitrarily 
deprivation of life.101 “National security considerations can have an impact on the threshold to be 
overcome by a person who is to be removed.102”  
The submission has common with Canada’s approach in Suresh. This paper concludes, therefore, 
courts should be careful when deciding to bind themselves in absolute rights provided in 
international instruments, if they have not been incorporated into their domestic laws. In 
situations when derogations are prohibited, for the sake of states’ security and protection of its 
citizen, states can derogate from obligations, again when they have not been incorporated by 
their legislations.  
This paper also submits, with comparison of approaches on practicing non refoulement in the 
United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand, and with reasons submitted by the governments 
above, balancing test is the most reasonable approach when deciding whether or not returning a 
person to potential danger.  
  
                                                 
101 Ibid at [22]. 
102 Ibid at.  
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